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Why Not Take All of Me?1 Reflections on
The Immortal Life of Henrietta Lacks2 and
the Status of Participants in Research
Using Human Specimens
Gail Javitt*
I. INTRODUCTION
It is perhaps a truism that each of us is greater than the
sum of our parts. This is particularly apparent when it comes
to our tissues, our cells, and their best-known contents, our
DNA. In a few cases, such as the case of a woman named
Henrietta Lacks, an individual’s tissue contains such rare
attributes as to result single-handedly in a scientific paradigm
shift. More typically, it is the study of vast numbers of tissue
samples, in concert, that allows science to move forward.
Indeed, recent genetic discoveries3 made possible by the study
of vast repositories of tissue samples known as “biobanks” have
 2010 Gail Javitt.
* J.D., M.P.H. Counsel, Sidley Austin, Research Scholar, Berman Institute of
Bioethics, Johns Hopkins University. The views expressed in this article are
those of the author. The author would like to thank Katherine S. Carner for
her outstanding research assistance in preparing this article, Joan Scott, Ruth
Faden, Joe Ali, and Rebekah Rasooly for their review of and comments on
earlier drafts of this article., and Suzanne Javitt for proofreading the
manuscript.
1. The phrase is taken from BILLIE HOLIDAY, All of Me, on LADY DAY:
THE COMPLETE BILLIE HOLIDAY ON COLUMBIA (1933-1944) (Columbia
Records, 2001) (1941).
2. REBECCA SKLOOT, THE IMMORTAL LIFE OF HENRIETTA LACKS (2010).
3. European League Against Rheumatism, Increased Levels of Certain
Cytokines and Chemokines Predict Onset of Rheumatoid Arthritis, E! SCI.
NEWS,
June
15,
2009,
http://esciencenews.com/articles/2009/06/15/increased.levels.certain.cytokines.
and.chemokines.predict.onset.rheumatoid.arthritis (reporting on a study that
identified factors that can predict the development of rheumatoid arthritis by
using blood donated to the Medical Biobank of Northern Sweden).
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made clear that, when studied in the aggregate, the biological
information contained in each of our individual bodies can yield
scientific insights and medical advances impossible through the
study of any one individual.
But the use of cells and tissues for research brings with it
myriad legal and ethical questions. How should we think about
the contributors of these cells and tissues? Are they—
increasingly “we” as the number of samples contained in
biobanks grows—human subjects of research? And, if so, what
consequences should flow from this classification? Should
contributors be given the opportunity to specify the type of
research that they will permit, or prohibit, with their
specimen? Should they be told about potential profits that may
accrue to researchers from the use of their tissues and, more to
the point, be entitled to a share of such profits? And what about
potential health information derived from the research—should
they have access to it? Should others? Even more challenging,
what rules should govern the voluntary provision of tissues by
patient groups to researchers solely for the purpose of
identifying the cause of their disease and developing
diagnostics and potential cures for their condition? And
perhaps most thorny of all: if, as some argue, providing our
tissues and cells for research is a moral imperative—part of our
collective civic responsibility4—does that give rise to a
reciprocal moral imperative to ensure that all participants have
access to the medical therapies that their cells, among millions
of others, helped to produce?5
These questions have been percolating for some time in the
law and bioethics literature6—ever since a man named Mr.
4. See, e.g., Rina Hakimian & David Korn, Ownership and Use of Tissue
Specimens for Research, 292 JAMA 2500, 2504 (2004).
5. See Ruth R. Faden, Editorial, “Immortal” Cells, Moral Issues: Case of
Henrietta Lacks Shows Need for Ethical Component in Health Care Reform,
BALT. SUN, Feb. 12, 2010, at 21.
6. See, e.g., Henry T. Greely, Breaking the Stalemate: A Prospective
Regulatory Framework for Unforeseen Research Uses of Human Tissue
Samples and Health Information, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 737 (1999); Henry
T. Greely, The Uneasy Ethical and Legal Underpinnings of Large-Scale
Genomic Biobanks, 8 ANN. REV. GENOMICS & HUM. GENETICS 343 (2007);
Karen J. Maschke & Thomas H. Murray, Ethical Issues in Tissue Banking for
Research: The Prospects and Pitfalls of Setting International Standards, 25
THEORETICAL MED. & BIOETHICS 143 (2004); ROBERT F. WEIR & ROBERT S.
OLICK, THE STORED TISSUE ISSUE: BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH, ETHICS, AND LAW
IN THE ERA OF GENOMIC MEDICINE (2004).
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Moore had his cancerous spleen removed and parlayed into a
lucrative cell line by his physician.7 Subsequent decades have
brought a handful of additional cases whose claimants have
included a cancer researcher,8 a Native American tribe,9 and
family members whose relatives suffered from a rare genetic
disease.10 So far, however, there has not yet emerged a
groundswell of “tissue rights” activists pressing for a resolution
of these questions or a consensus on how they should be
answered. And troublingly, the few courts that have had
occasion to address these questions have not applied any
coherent legal construct, but, as this article discusses, have
retrospectively applied various legal theories in the service of
what sometimes appear to be preordained policy goals.11 At the
same time, the number of individuals whose tissue samples are
contained in biobanks continues to rise, making it foreseeable
that more such disputes will arise in the future.
The Immortal Life of Henrietta Lacks, Rebecca Skloot’s
moving account of a woman whose cancerous cells
revolutionized medical research and facilitated many of today’s
lifesaving treatments—vaccines being just one example—thus
arrives at a particularly ripe time in scientific and societal
history. By focusing on the life and death of one woman,
Henrietta Lacks—the mother, literally, of the now-ubiquitous
HeLa12 cell line—and of the consequences that the use of her
tissues has had for her descendants, Skloot has put real faces
7. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
8. See Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667 (8th Cir. 2007), aff’g 437 F.
Supp. 2d 985 (E.D. Mo. 2006).
9. See Havasupai Tribe of the Havasupai Reservation v. Ariz. Bd. of
Regents, 204 P.3d 1063 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008). This case was recently resolved
through a settlement agreement in which the Arizona Board of Regents agreed
to pay $700,000 to forty-one of the Havasupai tribe’s members, to return blood
samples that were the basis for the suit, and to provide additional assistance
to the impoverished tribe. See Amy Harmon, Indian Tribe Wins Fight to Limit
Research of Its DNA, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2010, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/22/us/22dna.html?ref=us.
10. See Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F.
Supp. 2d 1064 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
11. See, e.g., Moore, 793 P.2d at 493–96 (holding that there is no property
interest in cells and policy concern that holding otherwise could hamper
medical research); Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1070 (holding that accused
doctor had no duty towards the complainant because the doctor was not the
treating doctor, and further speculating as to the possible chilling effects of
holding otherwise).
12. See text infra accompanyinig notes 20–25.
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and voices to abstract legal and policy questions. Although
some of the specific circumstances that gave rise to her cells
being used in research without her or her family’s informed
consent would be prohibited today, the story nevertheless has
salience to the modern debate. By telling the Lacks family’s
story in such an engaging, accessible way, Skloot has moved
the discussion beyond the narrow confines of courtrooms and
academia and into the public domain, where all those with a
stake in the answers can participate.
This article briefly describes the story of Henrietta Lacks,
as chronicled by Skloot. It then reviews recent findings
regarding the the public’s attitudes and expectations regarding
the use of their cells and tissues in research. It contrasts those
public attitudes and expectations with the judicial resolution of
legal disputes that have arisen between tissue contributors,
researchers, and institutions regarding the use of tissue
samples. Finally, it offers some basic principles that should
guide the development of policies for the use of human tissue
samples in research.
II. THE STORY OF HENRIETTA LACKS13
But for her cancer, Henrietta Lacks’s life would have most
likely gone little noticed. She was born in 1920, a poor black
woman from a family of tobacco farmers in rural Virginia.14 In
the 1940s, she moved with her husband to Baltimore to pursue
wartime employment opportunities in the shipyards.15 In 1951,
when she was thirty and had given birth to five children, she
developed gynecological bleeding and sought care at Johns
Hopkins in Baltimore, Maryland.16 Hopkins was founded as a
charity hospital and was the only major hospital in the area
that would treat African-American patients.17 At Hopkins, her
13. Unless other sources are cited, the information about Henrietta
Lacks’s life, the development of HeLa cells, and the views of her family
members are all derived from Skloot’s account. The author of this paper has no
independent knowledge of these issues. Additionally, the excerpts from the
book retain the native dialects of the speakers. In the preface to the book,
Skloot stated that she made an intentional choice to “capture the language in
which each person spoke,” in order to best reflect their lives and experiences.
See SKLOOT, supra note 2, at ix.
14. See id. at 18.
15. Id. at 26.
16. Id. at 13–15.
17. Id. at 15.
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physician initiated radium treatment, the standard of care at
that time.18 While she was under anesthesia for the procedure
that would sew tubes of radium to her cervix, the doctor
removed a small piece of her normal cervical tissue and another
small piece of her cervical cancer tissue, put them in a test
tube, and sent them to George Gey.19
George Otto Gey, a physician trained at Hopkins who was
at the time in his early 50s,20 had spent his career, along with
his wife and laboratory director Margaret, on a quest to develop
methods to grow cells outside the body. Keeping cells alive “in
culture” would allow scientists to experiment on the cells in
ways not possible in the body and thereby learn more about cell
biology. In particular, Gey hoped to develop cultures of cancer
cells to enable the study—and eventual cure—of this dread
disease.21 Thus, Gey obtained cancerous tissue samples
wherever he could find them22—and patients from the major
medical institution in which he worked served as a ready
source.
Until the day Henrietta Lacks’s cells were brought to his
laboratory, Gey’s quest had been unsuccessful. But unlike all
his other attempts to grow tissues outside the body, Henrietta’s
survived and thrived in culture, becoming the first
“immortalized” cell line, meaning cells that will replicate
themselves indefinitely as long as maintained under proper
conditions.23 On the day Henrietta died at the age of thirty-one,
George Gey went on national television announcing that a
breakthrough had occurred in cancer research.24 Holding up
the vial of cells, he introduced the world, for the first time,
“HeLa” cells, named for the first two letters of the first and last

18. Id. at 31–32.
19. Id. at 33.
20. See Medical Archives of the Johns Hopkins Medical Institutions, The
George O. Gey Collection, http://www.medicalarchives.jhmi.edu/sgml/gey.html
(last visited Apr. 27, 2010).
21. See MICHAEL GOLD, A CONSPIRACY OF CELLS: ONE WOMAN’S
IMMORTAL LEGACY AND THE MEDICAL SCANDAL IT CAUSED 16 (1986).
22. See Rebecca Skloot, Henrietta’s Dance, JOHNS HOPKINS MAG., Apr.
2000, at 16, available at http://www.jhu.edu/jhumag/0400web/01.html
[hereinafter Skloot, Henrietta’s Dance].
23. See SKLOOT, supra note 2, at 30; see generally Wikipedia, Biological
Immortality, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biological_immortality (last visited
Apr. 17, 2010).
24. See Skloot, Henrietta’s Dance, supra note 22, at 17.
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name of their source.25
Had the story ended here, the identity and legacy of
Henrietta Lacks would forever have remained a mystery.
Additionally, when viewed from the vantage point of the 1950s,
there would have been nothing particularly troubling about
how Gey came to possess ’her cells. At the time neither Gey—
nor pretty much anyone else in medicine—thought it necessary
to ask permission to remove tissue samples from a patient.26
Nor would researchers have thought it necessary for family
members to be told about the tissue sample’s fate, even if that
fate involved a dramatic scientific discovery using their loved
one’s tissues.
But the story did not end there. Although the
nomenclature used to identify the cell line was standard at the
time, because current rules about medical confidentiality had
not been established, it meant that the cells’ source was
identifiable. Although for many years the source of HeLa cells
was incorrectly identified in textbooks as “Helen Lane,”27 it was
perhaps inevitable that the identity of the cells’ true progenitor
would be revealed. And when her family members learned
serendipitously about the legacy of their mother’s’ cells two
decades after her death, they were understandably confused;
how could their mother, whom her younger children did not
even remember, still be “alive”? Moreover, they were distressed
by the unwanted media attention that the revelation of her
identity brought with it and by the fact that her cells were
being bought and sold, and angry that no one had asked
Henrietta—or them—whether her cells could be removed for
research in the first place.28
The subsequent action of Hopkins researchers, while
undertaken with apparently benign intent, only added to
feelings of deception and exploitation by Lacks’ children. In a
25. See id.
26. See id. at 19 (quoting Ruth Faden, executive director of the Johns
Hopkins Berman Institute for Bioethics, as describing the lack of informed
consent in Henrietta Lacks’s case as, “a sad commentary on how the
biomedical research community thought about research in the 1950s. But it
was not uncommon for physicians to conduct research on patients without
their knowledge or consent. That doesn’t make it right. It certainly wasn’t
right. It was also unfortunately common.”).
27. See id at 19; see also SKLOOT, supra note 2, at 108–09.
28. See Skloot, Henrietta’s Dance, supra note 22, at 19; see also SKLOOT,
supra note 2, at 5.

JAVITT_MACROS_AUTHOR EDITS (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

6/10/2010 3:08 PM

WHY NOT TAKE ALL OF ME?

719

bid to address what had become a serious impediment to using
HeLa cells in research, namely, that the cells were
contaminating other cell cultures,29 the Hopkins researchers
sought to leverage newly discovered DNA fingerprinting
methods to pinpoint whether HeLa cells were in other cells’
cultures.30 To do that, however, they needed samples of DNA
similar to that of the HeLa cells. They turned to Henrietta’s
children, who had received half of their genetic material from
her.31 However, although the researchers thought the family
understood the reason they were being asked to donate blood,
the family erroneously believed that they were providing blood
to determine whether they would develop cancer like their
mother.32 They were understandably worried when they did not
receive results from the “tests” they thought researchers had
performed.33
In addition to satisfying her own longstanding curiosity
regarding the history of HeLa cells, part of Skloot’s motivation
in documenting Henrietta’s story appears to have been to help
Henrietta’s children understand what happened to their
mother’s cells and gain some measure of closure with regards to
the wrong they perceive Hopkins to have perpetrated against
the Lacks family. To this end, she movingly recounts an episode
in which Hopkins researcher, Christoph Lengauer, invites two
of Henrietta’s children, Deborah and Zakariyya, to his
laboratory and shows them their mother’s cells (or, more
precisely, descendants of those original cells) under the
microscope.34 In addition to explaining the basics of cell biology
in a way that they could understand, Lengauer acknowledged
that the cells had come from a person, who was important not
only to researchers but to her family members. As recounted by
Skloot, the interaction between Lengauer and the family is
revealing of the different perceptions held by different parties
to the research enterprise and to the complex—and still
unresolved—issues at play in the use of human specimens:
“They’re beautiful,” [Deborah] whispered, then went back to staring
at the slide in silence. Eventually, without looking away from the

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

SKLOOT, supra note 2, at 153.
Id. at 216.
Id. at 185.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 264–66.
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cells, she said, “God, I never thought I’d see my mother under a
microscope—I never dreamed this day would ever come.”
“Yeah, Hopkins pretty much screwed up, I think,” Christoph said.
Deborah bolted upright and looked at him, stunned to hear a
scientist—one at Hopkins, no less—saying such a thing. Then she
looked back into the microscope and said, “John Hopkin [sic] is a
school for learning, and that’s important. But this is my mother.
Nobody seem to get that.”
“It’s true.” Christoph said. “Whenever we read books about science,
it’s always HeLa this and HeLa that. Some people know those are the
initials of a person, but they don’t know who that person is. That’s
important history.”
Deborah looked like she wanted to hug him. “This is amazing,” she
said, shaking her head and looking at him like he was a mirage.35

The discussion between Lengauer and Deborah also
touched on whether the family should have received a share in
the monetary profits from HeLa cells.
“Her cells are how it all started,” [Christoph] said. “Once there is a
cure for cancer, it’s definitely largely because of your mother’s cells.”
“Amen,” Deborah said. Then, without a hint of anger, she told him,
“People always gonna be makin money from them cells, nothing we
can do about that. But we not gonna get any of it.”
Christoph said he thought that was wrong. Why not treat valuable
cells like oil, he said. When you find oil on somebody’s property, it
doesn’t automatically belong to them, but they do get a portion of the
profits. “No one knows how to deal with this when it comes to cells
today,” he said. “When your mother got sick, doctors just did what
they wanted and patients didn’t ask. But nowadays patients want to
know what’s going on.”36

Those who believe that Hopkins’ actions with respect to the
Lacks family were consistent with the standards of the time,
and that no admission of wrongdoing is therefore warranted,
may find Lengauer’s statements naïve at best, and detrimental
to the scientific enterprise, as well as to Johns Hopkins, at
worst. It should be noted, however, as Skloot reports, that
neither Hopkins nor its researchers ever received direct
financial benefit from HeLa cells; the buying and selling of the
cells was, and is today, conducted by third parties unaffiliated
with the institution.37 Still, there is no doubt that the discovery
was beneficial to the researchers and the institution at which it
took place, in terms of intellectual achievement and

35. Id. at 266.
36. Id. at 267.
37. Id. at 194.
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professional prestige.
The duties that Hopkins did or did not owe to Henrietta
Lacks or her family members at the time their cells were
removed are beyond the scope of this article. Lengauer’s words
have relevance to the modern debate about the use of human
tissue in research in their simple acknowledgment of the
human origins of tissue samples used in research, of the
emotions and feelings of attachment that contributors of tissue
may possess towards their specimens regardless of whether
they have formal legal rights to them, and thus the perils of
failing to show respect for and of communicating clearly with
these contributors. As public opinion research suggests,
prospective contributors of human tissue, while they recognize
the value of their specimens for research and largely support
their use in the interest of findings new treatments for disease,
also, as Lengauer phrased it, “want to know what’s going on”38
with their tissue. Moreover, many would-be tissue contributors
believe researchers are obliged to inform them before using
their tissues in research.39 As this article discusses, the legal
disputes arising from use of tissue samples have involved in
some fashion failures to acknowledge the essential human
dimensions of the research enterprise involving human tissue.
III. OUR BODIES, OURSELVES?40 PUBLIC ATTITUDES
ABOUT RESEARCH WITH HUMAN SPECIMENS
A. WHAT IS A BIOBANK?
A biobank, also known as a biorepository, is a place that
“collects, stores, processes, and distributes biological materials
and the data associated with those materials.”41 These
“biological materials” are typically human biospecimens,
including tissue or blood, and the “data” are the clinical

38. Id. at 267.
39. Id. at 315.
40. The phrase is taken from THE BOSTON WOMEN’S HEALTH BOOK
COLLECTIVE, OUR BODIES, OURSELVES: A NEW EDITION FOR A NEW ERA ix
(2005).
41. See
LabAutopedia,
Biobank
Information
and
Sites,
http://labautopedia.com/mw/index.php/Biobank_information_sites#A_compliat
ion_of_external_resources_on_biobanks (last visited Mar. 25, 2010)
(highlighting that a biobank can also include tissues from other animals, cell
and bacterial cultures, and even environmental samples).
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information pertaining to the donor of that biospecimen.42
Biobanks allow researchers to conduct genome-wide association
(GWAS) studies, which are studies of the entire genome of
large numbers of people that seek to identify genetic markers
for disease.43 In recent years, biobanks have been increasingly
used to study complex diseases that are believed to have both
genetic and environmental causes.44 By one estimate, in 1999,
there were 178 million unique samples contained in
biorepositories and the rate of increase would be 20 million
samples per year.45 Assuming this rate of growth is correct, the
number in 2010 would be 398 million samples.
There is no mandated centralized registry of biobanks
either nationally or internationally; thus the actual number of
existing biobanks or number of discrete specimens contained
therein is not known.46 Perhaps the most well-known
biobanking effort worldwide is in Iceland. At the beginning of
42. Id.
43. See Stephen J. O’Brien, Stewardship of Human Biospecimens, DNA,
Genotype, and Clinical Data in the GWAS Era, 10 ANN. REV. GENOMICS &
HUM. GENETICS 193, 194 (2009).
44. See Genetics & Pub. Policy Ctr., Issue Brief, Using Genomic Databases
to
Study
Complex
Diseases,
available
at
http://www.dnapolicy.org/images/issuebriefpdfs/Genes%20and%20Environmen
t%20Issue%20Brief.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2008). For example, diabetes is
known to run in families, and researchers have identified some genetic
variants that increase an individual’s risk of developing the disease. However,
not all individuals who have the variants develop diabetes, and many people
with diabetes do not have the variants. This suggests that there may be more
variants that affect the risk of developing the disease, but it is also known that
diet and exercise play an important role. The collection of large numbers of
samples in biobanks could assist researchers in studying both genetic and
environmental factors influencing many common diseases, including diabetes,
cancer, and heart disease, which could “hold tremendous promise” for
understanding how those diseases develop.
45. See ELISA EISEMAN & SUSANNE B. HAGA, RAND MONOGRAPH REPORT,
HANDBOOK OF HUMAN TISSUE SOURCES: A NATIONAL RESOURCE OF HUMAN
TISSUE SAMPLES xvii (1999).
46. Moreover, consensus does not exist regarding what should be
considered a “biobank,” i.e., whether it includes all collections of human
specimens, regardless of their source, or is limited to only specimens collected
under particular circumstances. There are different mechanisms by which
samples become available for research, including from patients (leftover
samples) and from subjects who are actively recruited. Part of the challenge in
crafting legal rules in this context is the heterogeneity, and lack of consensus,
about the scope of what constitutes a biobank. See Susan M.C. Gibbons,
Regulating Biobanks: A Twelve-Point Typological Tool, 17 MED. L. REV. 313
(2009).
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2000, deCODE Genetics, Inc., a for-profit genetics company,
received a license to establish the Icelandic Health Sector
Database (HSD), based on a law passed in the late 1990s.47 It
was expected that “the database containing the healthcare data
and in the health records of all Icelanders alive and deceased
could be coupled with the genealogy and a genotypic database
thus yielding a super-database.”48 One of the most controversial
aspects of the Icelandic law governing the HSD was that it
permitted the disclosure of patients’ medical records to
deCODE based on the “presumed consent” of the patients
rather than express informed consent.49 Although the biobank
has been a “boon for genome-wide association studies,” the
company’s efforts to develop drugs from its research findings
have not been financially successful; the company was forced to
declare bankruptcy in 2009 and, in January 2010, was
purchased by Saga Investments LLC, a private consortium.50
Other countries have invested significant resources in the
development of national biorepositories. For example, the UK
Biobank, a not-for-profit charitable company funded by both
public and private sources,51 contains biological samples from
more than 340,000 individuals and seeks to eventually collect
samples from 500,000 individuals.52 In Canada, the
CARTaGene Project is currently seeking to recruit “a random
sample of 20,223 adults aged between 40 and 69 years from
47. See Sigridur Thorgeirsdottir, Genes of a Nation: The Promotion of
Iceland’s Genetic Information, 8 TRAMES 178, 178 (2004).
48. Id at 178–79.
49. See id.
50. See Jocelyn Kaiser, Cash-Starved deCODE is Looking for a Rescuer for
its Biobank, 325 SCI. 1054, 1054 (2009). According to a company press release,
“deCODE will continue all of its operations and product lines in this field,
including its deCODE diagnostics disease risk tests; deCODEme™ personal
genome scans; and contract service offerings including genotyping, sequencing
and data analysis. Going forward, deCODE will concentrate on translating its
science into medically and commercially important products and services.”
Press Release, deCode Genetics, Announcing the New deCode, Jan. 21, 2010,
available at http://www.decode.com/news/news.php?story=112.
51. Press Release, UK Biobank, HRH The Princess Royal Officially Opens
UK Biobank Storage Facility, Further Funding of £6 Million Announced (July
28, 2009), available at http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/docs/HRHVisit.pdf.
52. See Genetics Perspectives on Policy Seminar, Genetic Biobanks:
Deposits, Withdrawals, and Consumer Protection 4 (Dec. 9, 2008) (transcript
of
National
Press
Club
panel
discussion),
http://www.dnapolicy.org/resources/GenePOPS11transcriptedited.pdf
[hereinafter Genetics Perspectives Seminar].
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four metropolitan areas of Quebec” and to “create a bank
containing data on health and a biobank containing biological
material.”53 Other countries are also establishing biobanks.54 In
the United States, there are several large scale biorepositories
under the aegis of large academic institutions: Vanderbilt
University Medical Center,55 the Marshfield Clinic,56 and
Northwestern University.57 Kaiser Permanente, which is the
largest not-for-profit private health care provider in United
States,58 has also established a biobank and is recruiting
participants to contribute samples. The biobank contains
40,000 DNA samples from its members as of early 2009 and is
expected to contain 500,000 samples by 2010.59 The Kaiser
biobank is notable for the depth of information it will contain,

53. CARTaGENE,
General
Objectives,
http://www.cartagene.qc.ca/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=14
&Itemid=22 (last visited Mar. 25, 2010). The CARTaGENE Project is fully
publicly funded and will seek to recruit an additional 30,000 patients in 2011
if its public funding is renewed. See CARTaGENE, CARTaGENE Project FAQ,
http://www.cartagene.qc.ca/index.php?option=com_easyfaq&Itemid=52&lang=
english (last visited Mar. 25, 2010).
54. See, e.g. Norwegian Inst. of Pub. Health, Welcome to Biohealth
Norway,
http://www.fhi.no/eway/default.aspx?pid=238&trg=MainArea_5811&MainAre
a_5811=5906:0:15,4627:1:0:0:::0:0 (last visited May 10, 2010) (Norwegian
biobank intended to comprise “biological samples and standardized health and
exposure data from 500,000 Norwegian individuals of all ages, corresponding
to approximately 1/10 of the Norwegian population.”); LifeGene, About
LifeGene, http://lifegene.ki.se/about/index_en.html (last visited May 10, 2010)
(Swedish biobank intended to collect biological samples and medical
information for 500,000 individuals in Sweden).
55. Dep’t of Biomed. Informatics, Vanderbilt Univ. Med. Ctr., Vanderbilt
BioVU:
Vanderbilt’s
DNA
Databank,
http://dbmi.mc.vanderbilt.edu/research/dnadatabank.html (last visited Mar.
25, 2010). Vanderbilt’s biobank, which is known as “BioVU,” contains two
main components: a biobank of DNA samples from more than 50,000
individuals coded by a “Research Unique Identifier (RUI) and the “Synthetic
Derivative” database, a collection of deidentified information extracted from
Vanderbilt Medical Center’s electronic clinical information systems.
56. See Genetics Perspectives Seminar, supra note 52, at 4.
57. See id.
58. Kaiser Permanente, Fast Facts About Kaiser Permanente,
http://xnet.kp.org/newscenter/aboutkp/fastfacts.html (last visited Mar. 25,
2010). According to the company’s website, Kaiser serves more than 8.6
million members.
59. Susan J. Landers, Kaiser Fills a Biobank with a Wealth of Data, AM.
MED.
NEWS,
Jan.
13,
2009,
http://www.amaassn.org/amednews/2009/01/12/hlsc0113.htm.
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combining the participants’ DNA samples with “information on
their health, the air they breath[e] and their likely exposure to
toxins. The bank will also note whether sidewalks or safe parks
are near enough to allow the participants to exercise or if
nearby stores sell fresh vegetables.”60
B. PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD BIOBANKING
In recent years there have been several efforts to better
understand the public’s attitudes toward, and willingness to
contribute tissue samples to biobanks for research. This article
does not provide a comprehensive review of the literature—
much of which reports on research conducted in non-U.S.
populations.61 It also recognizes that, to the extent the research
discussed was conducted using hypothetical scenarios, asking
people what they would do under certain conditions may not be
an accurate measure of how people actually behave when
confronted with real-world circumstances.62 Nevertheless, this
type of research provides some insight regarding the public’s
views regarding use of their tissues in research. Studies to date
appear to support the following with respect to the attitudes of
the U.S. population: (1) there is significant public support for
the goals of biobank research;63 (2) a majority of the public

60. Id.
61. See, e.g., Philippe A. Melas et al., Examining The Public Refusal to
Consent to DNA Biobanking: Empirical Data from a Swedish PopulationBased Study, 36 J. MED. ETHICS 93 passim (2010); Aaro Tupasela et al.,
Attitudes Towards Biomedical Use of Tissue Sample Collections, Consent, and
Biobanks Among Finns, 38 SCANDINAVIAN J. PUB. HEALTH 46 passim (2010);
Klaus Hoeyer, Donors Perceptions of Consent to and Feedback from Biobank
Research: Time to Acknowledge Diversity?, PUB. HEALTH GENOMICS, Nov. 26,
2009,
http://content.karger.com/ProdukteDB/produkte.asp?Aktion=ShowFulltext&A
rtikelNr=262329&Ausgabe=0&ProduktNr=224224; Hazel Thornton, The UK
Biobank Project: Trust and Altruism Are Alive and Well: A Model for
Achieving Public Support for Research Using Personal Data, 7 INT’L J.
SURGERY 501 passim (2009); Shaun Treweek, Alex Doney & David Leiman,
Public Attitudes to the Storage of Blood Left Over from Routine General
Practice Tests and its Use in Research, 14 J. HEALTH SERVICES RES. & POL’Y
13 passim (2009).
62. See generally GEORGE F. BISHOP, THE ILLUSION OF PUBLIC OPINION:
FACT AND ARTIFACT IN AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION POLLS passim (2005).
63. See SHAWNA WILLIAMS ET AL., GENETICS AND PUB. POLICY CTR.,
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV., THE GENETICS TOWN HALL: PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT
RESEARCH ON GENES, ENVIRONMENT, AND HEALTH passim (2008), available at
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Genetics_a
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would agree, at least under some conditions, to contribute
tissue samples for research;64 (3) there is significant public
concern about ensuring the privacy of the information derived
from their tissue sample as well as any associated medical
information that is included about them as part of the
research;65 and (4) there is significant public interest in
receiving information from research conducted with their
tissues if it could be relevant to one’s health, and in having a
choice regarding what information they receive.66
A study undertaken by the Genetics and Public Policy
Center, at Johns Hopkins University, in 2007 is one example of
research that supports the above conclusions.67 The Center
sought to assess attitudes regarding a proposal being
considered by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and
other agencies to create a biobank including a nationally
representative sample of at least 500,000 people in order to
study the roles of genes and environment in health.68 Through
a combination of focus groups, town halls, and an online survey
of more than 4,500 U.S. adults, the Center assessed the public’s
willingness to participate in such research, privacy concerns,
views about informed consent and data sharing, and the impact
of modest incentives on willingness to participate.69
The population-based survey revealed that a majority of
respondents supported the general idea of the study and would

nd_Public_Policy/2009PCPTownHalls.pdf; David Kaufman et al., Veterans’
Attitudes Regarding a Database for Genetic Research, 11 GENETICS MED., May
2009, at passim [hereinafter Kaufman et al., Veterans’ Attitudes].
64. See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 63, at passim; David Kaufman et al.,
Public Opinion About the Importance of Privacy in Biobank Research, 85 AM.
J. HUM. GENETICS, Nov. 2009, at passim [hereinafter Kaufman et al., Public
Opinion]; Kaufman et al., Veterans’ Attitudes, supra note 63, at passim.
65. WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 63, at 8.
66. Id. at 9; Kaufman et al., Veterans’ Attitudes, supra note 63, at 334;
Murphy et al., Public Expectations for Return of Results from Large-Cohort
Genetic Research, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Nov. 2008, at 36–41 [hereinafter Murphy
et al., Public Expectations].
67. Results from this study were reported in a number of publications:
Kaufman et al., Public Opinion, supra note 64, at passim; Juli Murphy et al.,
Informed Perspectives on Health: Public Perspectives on Informed Consent for
Biobanking, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2128 passim (2009) [hereinafter Murphy
et al., Informed Perspectives]; Murphy et al., Public Expectations, supra note
66, at 36–41 .
68. Murphy et al., Informed Perspectives, supra note 67, at 2129.
69. Id.
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likely participate if asked.70 However, significant concern was
expressed about whether the privacy of their medical
information would be protected.71 Black non-Hispanics,
American Indians, Alaskan Natives, and participants who “selfidentified” as multi-racial were all “significantly more likely”
than white participants to state that they were concerned about
the privacy of their medical information.72
The survey also assessed preferences regarding consent.
Nearly half of those surveyed expressed a preference that
consent be obtained at the outset of all research to be
undertaken and not prior to each individual research project. 73
Supporters of this type of “blanket” consent appreciated that by
allowing participants to pick and choose the type of research
they would consent to, the ability to conduct the research could
be compromised, or at least made more complex.74 However, a
sizeable minority expressed a preference for separate consent
for each project undertaken with their samples.75 Findings
from the focus groups also shed light on individuals’
preferences regarding the return of research results. Focus
group participants were asked their preferences for receiving
results from different types of studies. While preferences
varied, accuracy of the information was a key predictor of
whether participants wanted to receive their results.
Actionability of information76 did not appear to be a strong
predictor of desire for return of results. For example, the
participants in the focus groups voiced a “strong desire” for the
research results, “even if they indicated a heightened risk of an
untreatable disease such as Alzheimer.”77 As one male focus
group participant stated, “You have an obligation to tell these
people. They expect something back from you. I’m volunteering
some of my flesh for you to evaluate me. Tell me what’s wrong
with it. Not that you could do something about it necessarily,

70. Id. at 2131; see also Kaufman et al., Public Opinion, supra note 64, at
645.
71. Murphy et al., Informed Perspectives, supra note 67, at 2131; Kaufman
et al., Public Opinion, supra note 64, at 645.
72. Kaufman et al., Public Opinion, supra note 64, at 645.
73. Murphy et al., Informed Perspectives, supra note 67, at 2131.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Murphy et al., Public Expectations, supra note 66, at 39.
77. WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 63, at 9.
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but at least let me know.”78
Some participants, however, believed that subjects should
recognize that the purpose of the research is to “generate
knowledge for the common good, and should participate out of
altruism rather than a desire to obtain results.”79
Members in most focus groups expressed the view that
study participants should be given choices at the beginning of
the study about what research results they would receive and
the frequency and mode of communication in which they
received them.80
The focus groups also yielded interesting, although
incomplete, insights into the public’s perception of the
participant-researcher relationship. According to the findings,
the term “contract” arose spontaneously and repeatedly in
discussing study participation.81 Focus group members “viewed
a contract as a binding agreement between participants and
researchers and did not view it simply as participants’
agreement to participate.”82 According to the findings, focus
group members “thought that a contract might offer
participants greater protection than an institutional review
board or study oversight committee and provide participants
with some level of recourse if researchers strayed from the
agreed-upon terms.”83 Participants also identified specific
terms they believed should be included in the contract between
researchers and participants, such as what specific samples
would be collected, how they would be used during the study,
who would have access to data from the study, what would
happen to the samples and data after the study closed, and
what would happen if the terms of the contract were
breached.84 While acknowledging that more research on the
specific understanding of the term “contract” would be useful,
the Center concluded that, “the repeated use of ‘contract’ by
focus group participants in each city and the overwhelming
desire for a contract demonstrated by the survey data
suggested that the public believes that there are or should be
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Murphy et al., Public Expectations, supra note 66, at 40.
WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 63, at 9.
Murphy et al., Public Expectations, supra note 66, at 40.
Murphy et al., Informed Perspectives, supra note 67, at 2131.
Id. at 2132.
Id.
Id.
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reciprocal obligations between researcher and participant.”85
The Center also hypothesized that the desire for a contract
may reflect a lack of trust in the research enterprise,86 but
noted that the success of biobanks “depends upon ongoing
public support, participation, and trust in the research
endeavor.”87 The importance of trust was similarly observed in
a survey conducted by researchers at Duke University, who
found that willingness to participate in biobank research is
strongly correlated with the degree of trust that respondents
have in researchers.88 As discussed in the next section, the
current regulatory framework is not optimized to instill trust
and foster participation in biobank research.
IV. PERCEPTION V. REALITY: THE CURRENT LEGAL
LANDSCAPE
A. HISTORICAL ROOTS OF HUMAN SUBJECT PROTECTION
The current framework for human subject protection is
rooted in, and is a reaction to, extreme physical and
psychological abuse. The Nuremberg Code—the seminal
articulation of the rights due participants in medical
research—emerged in the aftermath of unspeakable Nazi
atrocities in which prisoners were subjected to grueling
experiments of no possible benefit to them.89 The subsequent
Belmont Report,90 which laid the intellectual foundations for

85. Id. at 2133.
86. Id.
87. Murphy et al., Public Expectations, supra note 66, at 41.
88. Laura M. Beskow & Elizabeth Dean, Informed Consent for
Biorepositories: Assessing Prospective Participants’ Understanding and
Opinions, 17 CANCER EPIDEMIOLOGY, BIOMARKERS & PREVENTION 1440, 1440
(2008).
89. See 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY
TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 181–82 (1951)
[hereinafter NURENBERG CODE]. Among other principles, the Code states that
the “voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential,” and
specifies the components of such consent. The Code also specifies the limits of
the risks that subjects should be asked to assume as part of research and
articulates the duties that researchers owe to research participants: “The duty
and responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the consent rests upon each
individual who initiates, directs or engages in the experiment.” Id. at 181.
90. Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection
of Human Subjects of Research, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,192, 23,192–97 (April 18,
1979),
available
at
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legal protections for research subjects in the United States, was
written in response to, among other abuses, the decades-long
government-funded study in which poor black men with
syphilis were denied effective treatment in order to study the
natural history of disease.91
Thus the current legal framework for human subject
protection92—now nearing its fourth decade—was developed in
response to predominantly physical harms perpetrated on
vulnerable populations—including prisoners,93 children,94 the
disabled,95 and minorities96—who were unwilling or unwitting
subjects of research. A key remedial purpose of this framework
was to ensure that no human being would be required to take
part in physically risky research against his will. To effectuate
this purpose, a key component of the framework requires full
disclosure of the risks of participation to the individual prior to
any agreement to participate in research—what we now know
as “informed consent.” To be sure, the rules have been
broadened beyond that foundation to encompass certain types
of non-interventional research,97 but they are nevertheless
rooted in concerns about preventing physical harm to
vulnerable populations.
As discussed below, the use of tissue in research was not
contemplated at the time current regulations were put in place.
Yet, as discussed previously, the collection and use of stored
tissue for research has become commonplace, from our first day
of life forward.98 As discussed below, there are no generally
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/belmont.htm.
91. JAMES H. JONES, BAD BLOOD: THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS EXPERIMENT
passim (1981).
92. Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101–.505 (2009).
93. See ADVISORY COMM. ON HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS, FINAL
REPORT
pt.
2,
ch.
9,
at
263–83
(1995),
available
at
http://www.hss.energy.gov/healthsafety/ohre/roadmap/achre/report.html.
94. See id. at ch. 7, at 196–226.
95. See id. at ch. 5, at 139–71.
96. See id.
97. For example, the Common Rule covers research in which only
information is obtained from subjects if the information obtained “is recorded
in such a manner that human subjects can be identified, directly or through
identifiers linked to the subjects; and (ii) any disclosure of the human subjects’
responses outside the research could reasonably place the subjects at risk of
criminal or civil liability or be damaging to the subjects’ financial standing,
employability, or reputation.” 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(2) (2009).
98. Nearly every newborn in the United States has a small quantity of
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applicable rules governing the research use of such tissues.
Whether and to what extent federal rules apply depend on (1)
whether the research at issue is federally funded,99 and (2)
whether the tissue samples used in the research can be linked
back to their source, i.e., if they are “identifiable.”100 Even
where federal regulations do apply, they do not address many
of the concerns and preferences—discussed above—of the
contributors of such tissue. For non-federally funded research,
the applicable requirements vary based on individual state
laws, and, as described below, different courts have invoked
different legal theories to resolve disputes between researchers,
blood removed and tested for certain genetic disorders. The blood is collected
on “Guthrie cards,” which are named for the individual who developed them.
See Jean E. McEwen & Philip R. Reilly, Stored Guthrie Cards as DNA
“Banks”, 55 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 196, 196 (1994).The cards are often stored
indefinitely, and there are no uniform policies regarding their destruction or
use in research. Guthrie cards have the potential to be immensely useful in
research because they can be linked with the individual’s medical record, and
a researcher can obtain follow-up information to track the individual
longitudinally. Guthrie cards are also useful even if they are “anonymized.”
Their use in research, however, is controversial because they were obtained for
a health-related purpose and are being re-directed for research without the
consent of the parents or the child. At least two states, Texas and Minnesota,
have recently faced litigation brought by civil rights groups representing
parents concerned about potential uses of their children’s blood stored on
Guthrie cards. See Adam Doerr, Newborn Blood Spot Litigation: 70 Days to
Destroy 5+ Million Samples, GENOMICS L. REP. (Feb. 2, 2010),
http://www.genomicslawreport.com/index.php/2010/02/02/newborn-blood-spotlitigation-70-days-to-destroy-5-million-samples/ (last visited Apr. 27, 2010);
Katherine Drabiak-Syed, Newborn Blood Spot Litigation Continues in
Minnesota and Texas, PREDICTER NEWS (Nov. 20, 2009, 10:09 AM),
http://predicter.blogspot.com/2009/11/newborn-blood-spot-litigationcontinues.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2010) (describing the Minnesota and
Texas litigation). As a result of a settlement in the Texas litigation, the State
of Texas has agreed to destroy blood samples collected from more than 5
million newborn babies over the last five years. See Doerr, supra. The judge in
the Minnesota litigation dismissed the case in late November 2009, but the
plaintiffs plan to appeal the decision and to continue to object to the State’s
retention and use of newborn’s blood samples in research. See Katherine
Drabiak-Syed, Minnesota Judge’s Dismissal of Newborn Blood Spot Case
Misses the Mark, PREDICTER NEWS (Dec. 14, 2009, 8:27 AM),
http://predicter.blogspot.com/2009/12/minnesota-judges-dismissal-ofnewborn.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2010).
99. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (2009).
100. See OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROTS., DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE ON RESEARCH INVOLVING CODED PRIVATE
INFORMATION OR BIOLOGICAL SPECIMENS 3 (2008), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/cdebiol.pdf
[hereinafter
OHRP GUIDANCE].
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participants, and institutions.
B. FEDERAL OVERSIGHT OF TISSUE-BASED RESEARCH
The “Common Rule,”101 as the federal human subject
protection regulations are known as, sets forth requirements
for the protection of all human subjects of federally funded
research. These requirements include that the investigators
obtain the “legally effective informed consent of the subject or
the subject’s legally authorized representative.”102
The Common Rule applies to “all research involving
human subjects conducted, supported or otherwise subject to
regulation by any federal department or agency which takes
appropriate administrative action to make the policy applicable
to such research.”103 Although the federal regulations do not

101. Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101–.505 (2009).
102. Id. § 46.116. The basic elements of informed consent include: (1) a
statement that the study involves research, an explanation of the purposes of
the research and the expected duration of the subject’s participation, a
description of the procedures to be followed, and identification of any
procedures that are experimental; (2) a description of any reasonably
foreseeable risks or discomforts to the subject; (3) a description of any benefits
to the subjects or to others which may reasonably be expected from the
research; (4) a disclosure of appropriate alternative procedures or courses of
treatment, if any, that might be advantageous to the subject; (5) a statement
describing the extent, if any, to which confidentiality of records identifying the
subject will be maintained; (6) for research involving more than minimal risk,
an explanation as to whether any compensation and an explanation as to
whether any medical treatments are available if injury occurs and, if so, what
they consist of, or where further information may be obtained; (7) an
explanation of whom to contact for answers to pertinent questions about the
research and research subject’s rights, and whom to contact in the event of a
research-related injury to the subject; and (8) a statement that participation
is voluntary, refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to
which the subject is otherwise entitled, and the subject may discontinue
participation at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which the
subject is otherwise entitled.
103. Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (2009).
“Research” is defined as “a systematic investigation, including research
development, testing and evaluation, designed to develop or contribute to
generalizable knowledge.” Id. § 46.102(d). The term “human subject” is
defined as “a living individual about whom an investigator (whether
professional or student) conducting research obtains (1) Data through
intervention or interaction with the individual, or (2) Identifiable private
information.” Id. § 46.102(f). “Private information” is defined as “information
about behavior that occurs in a context in which an individual can reasonably
expect that no observation or recording is taking place, and information which
has been provided for specific purposes by an individual and which the
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explicitly define research with human tissue specimens as
human subject research, if such research involved “identifiable
private information,” it would clearly be encompassed within
the definition.104 However, what about tissue specimens from
which identifiers have been removed? The regulations
specifically exempt from the requirements of Part 46 research
that uses existing stored tissue specimens if “the information is
recorded by the investigator in such a manner that subjects
cannot be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the
subjects.”105 In addition, guidance issued by the Office of
Human Research Protections, within the NIH, states that
research involving “coded,” or non-identifiable, human
specimens is not considered human subjects research.106
In short, federally funded research involving identifiable
human biological specimens generally is considered human
subject research for the purposes of the Common Rule, while
federally funded research involving samples whose identity has
individual can reasonably expect will not be made public (for example a
medical record).” Id. The regulation provides, further: “Private information
must be individually identifiable (i.e., the identity of the subject is or may
readily be ascertained by the investigator or associated with the information)
in order for obtaining the information to constitute research involving human
subjects.” Id.
104. This is confirmed by the guidance document issued by the Office of
Human Research Protections (OHRP) of the NIH, which provides that, for the
purpose of the definition of human subject under 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(f),
obtaining identifiable private information or identifiable specimens includes:
“(1) using, studying, or analyzing for research purposes identifiable private
information or identifiable specimens that have been provided to investigators
from any source; and (2) using, studying, or analyzing for research purposes
identifiable private information or identifiable specimens that were already in
the possession of the investigator.” OHRP GUIDANCE, supra note 100, at 3. The
guidance provides that OHRP considers specimens to be “individually
identifiable as defined at 45 CFR 46.102(f) when they can be linked to specific
individuals by the investigator(s) either directly or indirectly through coding
systems.” Id.
105. Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R § 46.101(b)(4) (2009)
(emphasis added).
106. See OHRP GUIDANCE, supra note 100, at 3. The OHRP GUIDANCE
uses the term “coded” to signify that human specimens contain “identifying
information (such as name or social security number) . . . [that] has been
replaced with a number, letter, symbol, or combination thereof (i.e., the
code); . . . and a key to decipher the code exists, enabling linkage of the
identifying information to the . . . specimens.” Id. The OHRP GUIDANCE
clarifies the circumstances under which OHRP does not consider research
involving coded specimens to involve human subjects.
Id. at 4.
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been removed or has not been recorded generally is not
considered human subject research according to the statutory
definition.107 Even where the use of specimens is considered
human subject research, however, this does not mean that
researchers must address all of the issues that participants in
such research might view as important. For example, the
federal regulations do not require that participants be told all
of the possible uses of their tissue or to provide information
about study results.108 Nor do they clearly require researchers
to disclose whether and to what extent the research may have
commercial application.109 Thus even where they apply, the
protections provided under the Common Rule may not be
consonant with the expectations and preferences of those who
contribute their tissue for research.110 Additionally, the
107. In contrast, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) does appear to
consider research involving deidentified human specimens to be human
subject research, but the agency has stated that it will exercise enforcement
discretion and exempt such research from informed consent requirements if
certain conditions are met. See Food and Drug Admin., Guidance for Sponsors,
Institutional Review Bds., Clinical Investigators and FDA Staff: Guidance on
Informed Consent for In Vitro Diagnostic Device Studies Using Leftover
Human Specimens That are Not Individually Identifiable (Apr. 25, 2006),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/
GuidanceDocuments/ucm071265.pdf [hereinafter FDA, Guidance on Informed
Consent].
108. See Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2009) (listing
the requirements for informed consent under the rule).
109. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(3) does require that informed consent include a
“description of any benefits to the subject or to others which may reasonably
be expected from the research.” It could be argued that benefits to the
researcher from commercialization should be included within this language.
However, OHRP guidance on disclosure of financial interests does not
mandate any specific disclosure but rather raises points for IRBs, institutions,
and researchers to consider in “determining whether specific financial
interests in research affect the rights and welfare of human subjects and if so,
what actions could be considered to protect those subjects.” Dep’t of Health
and Human Services, Final Guidance Document,
Financial Relationships and Interests in Research Involving Human Subjects:
Guidance
for
Human
Subject
Protection
(2004),
available
at
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/finreltn/fguid.pdf.
110. Moreover, under certain circumstances, an IRB may even waive the
requirement for informed consent. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(c) provides:
An IRB may approve a consent procedure which does not include, or
which alters, some or all of the elements of informed consent set forth
above, or waive the requirement to obtain informed consent provided
the IRB finds and documents that:
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regulations have no applicability to research conducted with
private funds.111
C. CASE LAW
Although there have been only a few legal cases
involving disputes between the parties to human tissue
research, their resolution reveals starkly the gaps in the
current oversight framework as well as a lack of shared
perceptions by the different parties to the enterprise.
Furthermore, the lack of consistency in the opinions, as well as
the differences among jurists in the same case, demonstrates
the wide divergence of views on the issues and the need

(1) The research or demonstration project is to be conducted by or
subject to the approval of state or local government officials and is
designed to study, evaluate, or otherwise examine: (i) public benefit or
service programs; (ii) procedures for obtaining benefits or services
under those programs; (iii) possible changes in or alternatives to
those programs or procedures; or (iv) possible changes in methods or
levels of payment for benefits or services under those programs; and
(2) The research could not practicably be carried out without the
waiver or alteration.
111. However, FDA has created regulations requiring anyone who submits
a marketing application for a drug, biological product, or medical device to
disclose information about the compensation to, and financial interests of, any
clinical investigator conducting clinical studies covered by the rule. See 21
C.F.R. §§ 54.1(b), 312.53(c)(4), 314.50(k), 320.36(b), 330.10(f), 601.2(a),
807.31(d)(3), 812.43(c)(5), 814(b)(12), 860.123(a)(10) (2009). Under the
regulations, an applicant is required to submit to FDA a list of clinical
investigators who conducted covered clinical studies and certify and/or disclose
certain financial arrangements as follows:
1. [The applicant must certify] that no financial arrangements with
an investigator have been made where study outcome could affect
compensation; that the investigator has no proprietary interest in the
tested product; that the investigator does not have a significant
equity interest in the sponsor of the covered study; and that the
investigator has not received significant payments of other sorts;
and/or
2. [The applicant must disclose certain] specified financial
arrangements and any steps taken to minimize the potential for bias.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY: FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE BY CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS (Mar. 20,
2001), http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm126832.htm
[hereinafter FDA GUIDANCE]. FDA’s medical device regulations define a
“subject” as “a human who participates in an investigation, either as an
individual on whom or on whose specimen an investigational device is used or
as a control.” Medical Devices, Investigational Device Exemptions, 21 C.F.R. §
812.3(p) (2009) (emphasis added).
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prospectively112 to establish and apply clear and consistent
rules. From a doctrinal perspective, perhaps the most troubling
aspect of the current case law is that it fails to distinguish
clearly between the goal of informed consent, which, as
demonstrated above, is to protect vulnerable research
participants from abuses at the hands of researchers, and the
quasi-contractual concept of donation, which presumes that the
donor is in an equal position relative to the recipient and
therefore has the ability to establish the terms of the
donation.113
The first, and perhaps best known, legal dispute involving
the rights and expectations of human tissue contributors was
Moore v. Regents of the University of California.114 Mr. Moore
suffered from hairy-cell leukemia, and the recommended
treatment included removal of his spleen.115 The surgery was
apparently successful, and Mr. Moore recovered from his
illness.116 However, on several occasions his physician asked
him to return for follow-up visits and provide additional blood
samples, ostensibly to monitor his health.117
Without his knowledge, Moore’s treating physician, Dr.
Golde, along with a researcher he worked with, Dr. Quan, used
Moore’s cells from his spleen and other tissue samples he had
provided to develop a cell line.118 The University of California
Los Angeles (UCLA), which employed Dr. Golde and Dr. Quan,
filed a patent for the cell line, which listed Dr. Golde and Dr.
Quan as the inventors.119 UCLA and Dr. Golde then licensed
the cell line to two companies, who provided stock options,
112. This article should not be construed to recommend a categorical
prohibition on the use of specimens already contained in biorepositories whose
contributors are unknown, and in many cases are deceased. However, the
failure prospectively to develop rules to govern the use of specimens has
caused significant practical problems for researchers, as well as for
manufacturers, who rely on such samples to develop new medical products.
See, e.g., FDA, Guidance on Informed Consent, supra 107 (discussing the
difficulties associated with finding the source of a leftover specimen and
obtaining his or her consent, but noting that human subject protection still
must be ensured).
113. See infra note 157.
114. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
115. Id. at 481.
116. See id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 481–82.
119. Id.
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consulting fees, and salary support to Golde in exchange for
exclusive access to the materials and research performed, as
well as to the products derived from the cell line.120
When he discovered what had been done with his cells,
Moore sued UCLA, the researchers, and the companies for a
share of the profits derived from his cells.121 He asserted that
the unauthorized use of his cells constituted “conversion,” a
common law tort involving interference with one’s ownership or
right to possession of property.122 To succeed on a conversion
cause of action, a plaintiff must demonstrate ownership or the
right to possess the property in question.123 In denying Moore’s
conversion claim, the majority held that he had no ownership
interest in his cells.124 The court’s review of existing laws led to
the conclusion that Moore lacked the requisite property interest
to sustain a cause of action for conversion and that applying
this theory to Moore’s situation would require expanding the
scope of the tort.125 The majority declined to undertake such
expansion, citing concerns about hindering the conduct of
research by placing unreasonable burdens on researchers.126
Adopting the theory of liability asserted by Moore “threatens to
destroy the economic incentive to conduct important medical
research. If the use of cells in research is a conversion, then
with every cell sample a researcher purchases a ticket in a
litigation lottery.”127 Furthermore, “[b]ecause liability for
conversion is predicated on a continuing ownership interest,
‘companies are unlikely to invest heavily in developing,
manufacturing, or marketing a product when uncertainty about
120. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 482 (Cal. 1990).
121. See id.
122. Id. at 487.
123. Id. at 488.
124. See id. at 492–93. First, the court rejected the argument that a person
has an absolute right to the unique products of his or her body on the basis
that Moore’s cells were “no more unique to Moore than the number of
vertebrae in the spine or the chemical formula for hemoglobin.” Id. at 490.
Furthermore, the court reviewed California statutes dealing with various
types of tissues and concluded that these laws did not treat tissues as
property, but rather as “objects sui generis,” and that different types of tissues
were subject to different legal requirements based on the policy objective
sought to be achieved. See id. at 489.
125. Id. at 493.
126. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 493–96 (Cal.
1990).
127. Id. at 495–96.
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clear title exists.’”128 The court stated that extending property
rights to excised tissues was within the proper purview of the
legislature, not the courts.129
The court also rejected the argument that allowing a cause
of action for conversion was necessary to protect a patient’s
autonomy and dignity, holding that such interests were
adequately protected through informed consent.130 The court
did appear sensitive to the fact that Moore’s physician had
failed to tell him how his cells were being used and, moreover,
had induced him to provide additional samples following his
surgery under false pretenses.131 However, the court appeared
to believe that expanding the physician’s duties of informed
consent could provide adequate protection against such
deception.132 Indeed, the court found that Dr. Golde had
breached his duty of informed consent by failing to inform
Moore of his economic interest in the cells before seeking his
consent to perform surgery.133 The court stated that, just as
patients must be told about physical risks of a procedure, they
must be informed of economic interests that might cloud the
physician’s judgment.134
[A] physician who treats a patient in whom he also has a research
interest has potentially conflicting loyalties. This is because medical
treatment decisions are made on the basis of proportionality—
weighing the benefits to the patient against the risks to the
patient . . . . A physician who adds his own research interests to this
balance may be tempted to order a scientifically useful procedure or
test that offers marginal, or no, benefits to the patient.135

In holding in favor of Moore on informed consent while
ruling against his claim of conversion, the court appears to
have been balancing its desire to protect the research
enterprise while preventing blatant deception of patients.
However, the court’s reasoning with respect to informed
consent is flawed. In particular, the court failed to distinguish
between Moore as a patient and Moore as a research subject.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
1990).
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 496.
Id.
Id. at 496–97.
See id. at 496 n.41.
See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 496–97 (Cal.
Id. at 486, 497.
Id. at 485.
Id. at 484 (emphasis in original).
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Although there was evidence presented to the district court
that Golde was aware of the potentially lucrative nature of
Moore’s cells before he removed his spleen, and therefore had a
potentially conflicting interest,136 there was no evidence that
this actually motivated his decision to perform the surgery or,
moreover, that the surgery was not the appropriate treatment
for Moore’s underlying medical condition. Disclosing his
financial interest might have led Moore to seek a different
doctor, but presumably that doctor also would have concluded
that the surgery was necessary to treat his leukemia. Thus, at
least in this instance, there is no evidence that disclosure of
Golde’s financial interest in his cells would have made Moorethe-patient, better off, and might have needlessly led him to
reject a competent physician.137 Moreover, even recognizing
that there are circumstances where a patient’s well-being may
be compromised by his or her treating physician’s conflict of
interest, financial or otherwise, and that financial disclosure
therefore may be an important element of informed consent to
treatment, the court’s reasoning nevertheless was insufficient
in its failure to consider Moore-the-research-subject separately
from Moore-the-patient. When Golde took Moore’s cells for use
in research without telling him, he committed a wrong to
Moore-the-research-subject independently of whatever duties
he owed Moore as a patient. The court failed to acknowledge
Moore’s transition from patient to research subject, and
therefore failed to consider the duties owed to Moore in that
capacity. Had Golde not been his treating physician, or if he
had had no inkling of the cells’ potential research value at the

136. According to the California Supreme Court, Moore alleged in his
complaint that before Dr. Golde recommended to Moore that his spleen be
removed, Golde was “aware that ‘certain blood products and blood components
were of great value in a number of commercial and scientific efforts’ and that
access to a patient whose blood contained these substances would provide
‘competitive, commercial, and scientific advantages.’” Id. at 481.
137. The majority did acknowledge that requiring disclosure could
undermine a patient’s judgment, but nevertheless viewed such disclosure as
necessary. See id. at 484–85 (“To require disclosure of research and economic
interests may corrupt the patient’s own judgment by distracting him from the
requirements of his health. But California law does not grant physicians
unlimited discretion to decide what to disclose. Instead, it is the prerogative of
the patient, not the physician, to determine for himself the direction in which
he believes his interests lie. Unlimited discretion in the physician is
irreconcilable with the basic right of the patient to make the ultimate
informed decision.”) (internal quotation marks, citations and footnote omitted).
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time of the surgery, he would have been under no obligation, by
the court’s reasoning, to inform Moore of the value of his cells.
Nor, by the court’s reasoning, did Dr. Quan or UCLA have any
duty to obtain Moore’s consent to use his cells. The court’s
limited holding therefore does little to protect the interests of
the growing number of contributors of tissue samples who are
not patients, as becomes apparent in Greenberg v. Miami
Children’s Hospital Research Institute,138 discussed below.
In Moore, Justice Broussard, concurring and dissenting,
disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that the tort of
conversion was inapposite.139 He framed the issue not as about
the right to tissue once it was removed, but rather as about the
right of an individual to determine the disposition of his of her
excised tissue before it is removed.140 Justice Mosk, who also
disagreed with the majority’s conclusion regarding the tort of
conversion, rejected the majority’s focus solely on the needs of
the research enterprise, stating that its “single policy
consideration . . . is outweighed by . . . policies that are
promoted by recognizing that every individual has a legally
protectible [sic] property interest in his own body and its
products,” as well as by considerations of equity, which would
preclude the “unjust enrichment of any member at the expense
of another.”141 Giving eloquent voice to the views expressed by
Dr. Lengauer—the researcher who felt the Lacks family had
been wronged—Justice Mosk noted that:
There is . . . a third party to the biotechnology enterprise—the patient
who is the source of the blood or tissue from which all these profits
are derived. While he may be a silent partner, his contribution to the
venture is absolutely crucial . . . but for the cells of Moore’s body
taken by defendants there would have been no Mo cell line at all. Yet
defendants deny that Moore is entitled to any share whatever in the
proceeds of this cell line. This is both inequitable and immoral.142

Cases that have arisen since Moore have similarly failed to
properly consider the status of the third parties to
biotechnology, and have consistently resolved disputes in favor
of the institutions at which the research took place, albeit
138. Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F.
Supp. 2d 1064 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
139. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 499 (Cal. 1990)
(Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
140. Id. at 501.
141. Id. at 515–16 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 516 (footnote omitted).
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based on different legal theories. In Greenberg, family members
with children suffering from Canavan disease, a rare genetic
disorder, along with non-profit organizations with an interest
in the disease, sought help from defendant Dr. Matalon in
identifying the genetic mutation causing the illness and in
developing a test to detect the mutation.143 Plaintiffs provided
support to Dr. Matalon by contributing tissue, developing a
patient registry, and raising money.144 Dr. Matalon identified
the gene and developed the test, but his research institution,
Miami Children’s Hospital, patented the gene, listed him as an
inventor, and sought to enforce the patent and collect royalties
for the test’s performance.145 The plaintiffs, who were not told
that the gene would be patented and had expected the test to
be freely available, sued the researcher and institution alleging
lack of informed consent, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust
enrichment, fraudulent
concealment, conversion, and
misappropriation of trade secrets.146 With the exception of
unjust enrichment,147 the court dismissed all of plaintiffs’

143. Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1066–67.
144. Id. at 1067.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1068.
147. The plaintiffs had alleged that Miami Children’s Hospital was being
unjustly enriched by collecting license fees under the patent. Id. at 1072.
“Under Florida law, the elements of a claim for unjust enrichment are (1) the
plaintiff conferred a benefit on the defendant, who had knowledge of the
benefit; (2) the defendant voluntarily accepted and retained the benefit; and
(3) under the circumstances it would be inequitable for the defendant to retain
the benefit without paying for it.” Id. The parties agreed that the plaintiffs
conferred a benefit on the defendants, but the defendants contended that the
plaintiffs had not suffered any detriment, nor had any plaintiff been denied
access to testing for Canavan disease. Id. The court held that the complaint
alleged “more than just a donor-donee relationship,” in that the “facts paint a
picture of a continuing research collaboration that involved Plaintiffs also
investing significant resources in the race to isolate the Canavan gene.” Id. at
1072–73. Under those facts as alleged, the court concluded that the plaintiffs
had “sufficiently pled the requisite elements of an unjust enrichment claim”
and denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss that claim. Id. at 1073. The
parties ultimately settled the suit. See Joint Press Release, Canavan
Foundation (Sept. 29, 2003), http://www.canavanfoundation.org/news/0903_miami.php (last visited Apr. 27, 2010). Although the terms of the
settlement are confidential, the Canavan Foundation reported that the
agreement “provides for continued royalty-based genetic testing by certain
licensed laboratories and royalty-free research by institutions, doctors, and
scientists searching for a cure.” Id.
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claims.148 In particular, the Greenberg court held that Dr.
Matalon did not have a duty of informed consent with respect
to the plaintiffs because, unlike Dr. Golde in Moore, he was not
their treating physician.149 The court then questioned whether
the duty of informed consent was applicable, under state law,
to medical research (while acknowledging that the duty did
apply under federal law, which was not at issue in the case).150
Even if the duty did apply, moreover, the court held that it did
not include a duty to disclose the researcher’s financial
interests in research, because the plaintiffs were tissue donors,
and not “objects of human experimentation.”151
Like the majority in Moore, the Greenberg court appeared
to preference the medical research needs over the concerns of
research participants.152 Also like the Moore decision, the
Greenberg court’s reasoning is flawed. Just as the Moore court
conflated the contexts of medical treatment and human subject
research in a manner that discounted Moore’s interest as a
research subject, the Greenberg court confused the differing
premises underlying informed consent and donation153—again
to the plaintiffs’ disadvantage. The plaintiffs in Greenberg were
required by the research institution to sign an informed
consent document.154 The context of such signature was clearly

148. Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1077–78.
149. See id. at 1070.
150. Id. at 1070–71.
151. Id. at 1071.
152. See id. at 1070.
153. Because donations are considered gifts and are given without
consideration, an agreement to donate is considered an imperfect contract that
is void for want of consideration under common law legal systems, although
such agreements are considered valid contracts in civil law legal systems.
Compare 4 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 7:11 (4th ed. 2008)
(discussing a lack of consideration in a common law system) with Bürgerliches
Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] Aug. 18, 1896, Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBl] 195,
as amended, § 311 (listing the requirements of contract formation under
German law, a civil law legal system). The doctrine of promissory estoppel,
which applies where enforcement of promises unsupported by consideration is
necessary to avoid injustice, has been used to enforce promises based on
donations or gifts. See WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 8:8 (discussing the use of
the doctrine of promissory estoppel to enforce “purely donative gratuitous
promises”). Although an agreement to donate is not enforceable, when a
donation is made it acquires the legal status as a transfer of property.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.1
cmt. a (2003).
154. Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F.
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a research context—the whole point of providing their tissue
was in order to have research performed with their tissues.
Thus at the time the tissue was provided by the plaintiffs, they
had been assigned the role of human subject by the institution,
a role by its nature placed the researcher in a fiduciary
relationship with the human subjects of research and that
therefore required researchers to ensure that that their
participation was freely agreed to and that they were given all
the information necessary to make a decision.155 In rejecting
plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary duty claim, the court held that
plaintiffs had failed to allege sufficiently that defendants had
accepted the trust placed in them by plaintiffs, a prerequisite
for a finding of breach of fiduciary relationship under common
law. “There is no automatic fiduciary relationship that attaches
when a researcher accepts medical donations, and the
acceptance of trust . . . cannot be assumed once a donation is
given.”156 However, the court failed to consider that simply
designating plaintiffs as human subjects, they stood in a trust
relationship with them and were not free to reject plaintiffs’
trust after the fact.157
The court’s after-the-fact designation of the plaintiffs as
“donors” similarly seems to misapprehend the significance of
the context in which such “donation” took place. According to
the court, plaintiffs “are more accurately portrayed as donors
rather than objects of human experimentation, and thus the
voluntary nature of their submissions warrants different
treatment.”158 However, plaintiffs signed a consent document
indicating that the purpose of their participation was for a
Supp. 2d 1064, 1068 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
155. See NUERNBERG CODE, supra note 89 (“The duty and responsibility for
ascertaining the quality of the consent rests upon each individual who
initiates, directs or engages in the experiment.”).
156. Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1072.
157. For reasons not explained by the court, the decision was based on
state law, not federal, and the court found that Florida law was unclear on
whether there was a duty of informed consent for research subjects, although
defendants conceded that a duty “does attach at some point in the
relationship” Id. at 1070. Moreover, the court appears to have misunderstood
the purpose, goals, and duties attendant to human subject research generally,
and informed consent specifically, under federal law. Oddly, the court fails to
cite the Common Rule, 45 C.F.R. Part 46, and cites FDA regulations despite
the fact that the research does not appear to have involved FDA-regulated
products. Id. at 1069.
158. Id. at 1071.

JAVITT_MACROS_AUTHOR EDITS (DO NOT DELETE)

744

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

6/10/2010 3:08 PM

[Vol. 11:2

research purpose, namely, “to identify mutations in the
Canavan gene which may lead to carrier detection in my
family.”159 Nothing in the consent process could reasonably
have alerted plaintiffs to the fact that they were engaging in a
legal transaction with the defendants, one in which the
institution had no obligation to act in their best interest. Had
they been so alerted, they might have made more efforts to
make an independent assessment of their own best interests
before agreeing to donate their tissues, for example, by
requesting the inclusion of specific terms as a condition of their
donation.
As a consequence, plaintiffs failed to receive the protective
benefits of informed consent that should have been affored by
their status as research subjects, and also were not given the
requisite access to information and ability to negotiate on equal
terms that one would expect to accompany the status of donor.
This status confusion is echoed in the court’s decision in
Washington University v. Catalona.160 There the dispute was
between a researcher, Dr. Catalona, and the institution that
had employed him, but the legal status of the disputed tissue
samples’ contributors was the key determining factor in the
court’s ruling. In that case, Dr. Catalona had established a
biorepository containing an extensive collection of tissue
samples from patients with prostate cancer, many of whom he
had treated personally.161 The biorepository was housed at the
university and funded by the institution.162 Patients were
invited to participate in genetic research by providing their
tissue samples to the biorepository and were required to sign a
consent form.163 The forms typically used the word “donate” to
characterize the delivery of the sample, and the participants
were informed that their samples might be used by different
entities, that they had a right to withdraw from the research
and have their samples destroyed, and that they did not have
any claim to the donated tissues or materials or processes

159. Complaint at 12, Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst.,
Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1068 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (No. 00C–6779), available at
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/business/20070128_FRAMING.pdf.
160. Wash. Univ. v. Catalona (Catalona II), 490 F.3d 667 (8th Cir. 2007),
aff’g 437 F. Supp. 2d 985 (E.D. Mo. 2006).
161. Id. at 670.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 671.
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derived from them.164
When he left Washington University, Dr. Catalona sought
to take the collection with him to his new institution.165 To that
end, he obtained release forms from the research participants
indicating that they sought transfer of their samples to him.166
Washington University then sought a declaration that it owned
the biorepository and the tissue samples, while Dr. Catalona
sought a declaration that participants could directly transfer
their materials to him.167
The district court held that Washington University owned
the samples, a decision that was upheld on appeal.168 The
appellate court framed the question as follows: “[Do]
individuals who make an informed decision to contribute their
biological materials voluntarily to a particular research
institution for the purpose of medical research retain an
ownership interest allowing the individuals to direct or
authorize the transfer of such materials to a third party”?169
The court held that they do not, finding that the samples
were “inter vivos” gifts from the patients to the institution.170
The court found that the patients had donative intent, had
delivered their property to the donee (the institution), and that
the gift had been accepted by the donee.171 Further, the court
held that the fact that the consent form included a right to
revoke or destroy the samples did not negate their gift
status.172
Like Greenberg, the court’s decision in Catalona is
problematic because it confuses informed consent with
donation. The two documents that the court evaluates to assess
the tissue contributors’ intent were the consent document and
the genetics research information brochure.173 These
documents were signed by the contributors in the context of a

164. Id.
165. Catalona II, 490 F.3d 667, 672 (8th Cir. 2007).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See id. at 673, 677.
169. Id. at 673.
170. Id. at 673–74.
171. See Catalona II, 490 F.3d 667, 674–75 (8th Cir. 2007).
172. Id. at 675 (“The attachment of a condition to a charitable donation of
property does not negate or void an otherwise valid inter vivos gift.”).
173. Id. at 671.
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research study in which they were being invited to
participate.174 Although the term “donation” does appear in
these documents, it is highly unlikely that participants
appreciated—nor should they have been expected to
appreciate—that they were signing away legal rights by
agreeing to participate in research. Construing the term
“donation” after the fact as a legal concept under which
participants retained no rights to control the use of their
tissues therefore seems to take advantage of their good faith
belief that they were human subjects participating in research,
who may have reasonably presumed that the institution was
obliged to look out for their best interests—expectations they
would not reasonably have obtained were they donors engaged
in an arms length negotiation.
The court also failed to address the troubling issue of
“waiver.” The consent form signed by the contributors included
an agreement to waive any claim to “donated” body tissues and
“the right to any new material or process developed through
research involving [his] tissues.”175 Such waiver language
appears to violate federal regulations, against the inclusion of
exculpatory language in consent documents. These regulations
state that “[n]o informed consent, whether oral or written, may
include any exculpatory language through which the subject or
the representative is made to waive or appear to waive any of
the subject’s legal rights.”176 The language quoted by the court
is, at least arguably, “exculpatory” within the meaning of the
regulations. Yet, by framing the transaction as a donation, the
court avoided the question of the consent documents’ validity:
174. Id. at 674.
175. Id. at 671 (alterations in original).
176. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2009). OHRP has issued a guidance document
distinguishing between unacceptable exculpatory language and acceptable
language, which demonstrates the fine line separating the two. See OFFICE
FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROTS., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
“EXCULPATORY LANGUAGE” IN INFORMED CONSENT (Nov. 15, 1996),
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/exculp.htm
[hereinafter
OHRP INFORMED CONSENT]. For example, according to the guidance, it is
impermissible to use the following language: “I voluntarily and freely donate
any and all blood, urine, and tissue samples to the U.S. Government and
hereby relinquish all right, title, and interest to said items.” Id. However, it is
permissible to include the following statement in an informed consent
document: “Tissue obtained from you in this research may be used to establish
a cell line that could be patented and licensed. There are no plans to provide
financial compensation to you should this occur.” Id.
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Because the specific language contained in the consent forms and
brochures, as well as the circumstances surrounding the
[contributors’] voluntary decision to donate their biological materials,
convinces us [they] intended to make inter vivos gifts of their
materials, we find it unnecessary to address the effect or validity of
the consent forms’ waiver language . . . .177

177. Catalona II, 490 F.3d 667, 675 n.7 (8th Cir. 2007). The court also gave
short shrift to another central tenet of the Common Rule, which is that
participants may “discontinue participation at any time.” See 45 C.F.R. §
46.116(a)(8) (2009). The consent form signed by participants stated that their
participation was voluntary and that they could withdraw their consent “at
any time.” Wash. Univ. v. Catalona (Catalona I), 437 F. Supp. 2d 985, 990
(E.D. Mo. 2006). Some of the consent forms indicated that participants “could
request destruction of their biological materials if they changed their minds
about participating in the study” while others did not. Catalona II, 490 F.3d
at 671. Washington University took the position that it could satisfy
participants’ request to withdraw by anonymizing the samples while
continuing to use them for research. Catalona I, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 992. The
district court appears to have accepted as valid Washington University’s
assertion and the issue was not reviewed on appeal. However, there is
certainly room for question whether after-the-fact anonymization satisfies the
letter or spirit of the federal human subjects regulations. Nevertheless,
accepting Washington University’s interpretation was consonant with the
court’s conclusion that the participants did not retain proprietary interests in
their tissues.
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V. ANALYSIS
A. IGNORING THE “THIRD PARTY” TO RESEARCH: THE MORAL
AND PRACTICAL DANGERS
While one must be careful about making broad
generalizations from small numbers, the few cases that have
been decided have confused the legal status of contributors of
human tissue and have not adequately considered the
preferences and expectations of human tissue donors. While
there are important policy objectives that may underlie the
court decisions—specifically, researchers’ need for unimpeded
access to samples in order to make discoveries with the
potential for broad societal benefits—there is danger in an
enterprise that reflexively preferences the needs of research
over those of tissue contributors. First, there is moral danger,
specifically, the risk that in focusing solely on the research
need for tissue samples we will devalue the human dignity of
the contributors of those tissues. The Catalona court’s
willingness to ignore the question of whether the consent
documents were valid shows how easy it is to overlook
individual protections in pursuit of objectives with potential to
benefit many. Justice Mosk, in his dissent in Moore, recognized
the dangers of such devaluation:
[O]ur society acknowledges a profound ethical imperative to respect
the human body as the physical and temporal expression of the
unique human persona. One manifestation of that respect is our
prohibition against direct abuse of the body by torture or other forms
of cruel or unusual punishment. Another is our prohibition against
indirect abuse of the body by its economic exploitation for the sole
benefit of another person. The most abhorrent form of such
exploitation, of course, was the institution of slavery. Lesser forms,
such as indentured servitude or even debtor’s prison, have also
disappeared. Yet their specter haunts the laboratories and
boardrooms of today’s biotechnological research-industrial complex. It
arises whenever scientists or industrialists claim, as defendants claim
here, the right to appropriate and exploit a patient’s tissue for their
sole economic benefit—the right, in other words, to freely mine or
harvest valuable physical properties of the patient’s body: “Research
with human cells that results in significant economic gain for the
researcher and no gain for the patient offends the traditional mores of
our society in a manner impossible to quantify. Such research tends
to treat the human body as a commodity—a means to a profitable
end. The dignity and sanctity with which we regard the human whole,
body as well as mind and soul, are absent when we allow researchers
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to further their own interests without the patient’s participation by
using a patient’s cells as the basis for a marketable product.178

Second, there is practical danger. Public participation is
essential to successful biobank research. Likewise, public trust
of the research enterprise is essential to such participation.179
If prospective contributors of tissue samples perceive that the
process is unfair, that information important to them is being
withheld, or simply that their contribution is not appreciated,
they may begin to object to the use of their samples in
research—declining participation when given the opportunity
or even taking legal action when tissue is taken without their
request.180 Although their chances of success in such disputes
would be low if current precedent is any guide, such actions
could nevertheless pose an unnecessary and costly disruption to
researchers and institutions, and undermine potentially useful
collaborations between the public and scientists.
B. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
What, then, is the alternative? Must researchers and their
institutions open their coffers and shell out millions of dollars
for what is essentially medical waste, when the
“manufacturers” of the specimens expended no effort to acquire
them, may have needed to have them removed for their own
medical benefit, and, on their own, could not use them to make
discoveries for the benefit of society?181 For the researchers who
put in the time and effort to extract from these specimens novel
and important research findings, and for the institutions that
support them, demands by tissue contributors for compensation
or even simply for information may seem like the ultimate
presumption. Such feelings may perhaps best be expressed by

178. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 515–16 (Cal. 1990)
(Mosk, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
179. See Beskow & Dean, supra note 88, at 1447.
180. Moore, 793 F.2d at 516 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (citing Thomas H.
Murray, Who Owns the Body? On the Ethics of Using Human Tissue for
Commercial Purposes, IRB, Jan.–Feb. 1986, at 1, 5) (“As Dr. Thomas H.
Murray, a respected professor of ethics and public policy, testified before
Congress[:] ‘[i]f biotechnologists fail to make provision for a just sharing of
profits with the person whose gift made it possible, the public’s sense of justice
will be offended and no one will be the winner.’”).
181. See David Korn, Dangerous Intersections: New Proposals to Protect
Genetic Privacy May Collide with the Public Interest in Fostering Medical
Research, ISSUES SCI. & TECH., Fall 1996, at 55, 59.
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reference to the old joke about a milliner, who when questioned
by a customer about why his hats cost so much, when they are
made of “just a few bits of ribbon,” replies “Madam, the ribbon
is free.”
Why, then, should the ribbon (tissue) not be free to a
researcher seeking to use it to advance science and make
discoveries for the benefit of human health? After all, its
research value lies only in the information or products that
may be derived from it through the input of scientists’ time and
expertise. Moreover, only in rare instances does a single sample
prove uniquely valuable, as did Henrietta Lacks’ cells, and that
value typically is not apparent before the fact.
However, the true value of the tissue cannot be presumed;
its assessment requires consultation with the person who
provided it. In the joke about the ribbon, the milliner has made
the choice to charge the customer only for his labor and not for
the materials. Yet presumably the ribbon maker did not donate
these materials to the milliner. Whether the ribbon maker
expended any effort to make the ribbon or obtained it for free is
not the milliner’s concern; he needed the ribbon and was
required to engage in a conversation with the supplier of the
ribbon maker about the terms under which the ribbon would be
supplied. While a single tissue sample may have little
monetary value, its true value—which includes all of the
considerations that the public expresses when asked about the
use of their tissues in research—cannot properly be assessed
without consulting with those contributors.
But, it may be argued, there is no consensus about whether
human tissue, once removed from the body, is even property. If
it is not property, on what basis do we restrict access to it by
others? Some might argue that that would be like asking the
milliner to track down and reimburse the ribbon manufacturer
who left scraps of ribbon in the milliner’s shop. While it is true
that there is no legal consensus on the status of human
tissue—although the issue has been the subject of scholarly
discussion182—resolution of the property status is unnecessary
in order to impose an obligation on researchers with respect to

182. See R. Alta Charo, Body of Research — Ownership and Use of Human
Tissue, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1517 passim (2006); Radhika Rao, Genes and
Spleens: Property, Contract, or Privacy Rights in the Human Body?, 35 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 371 passim (2007).
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prospective contributors of human tissue. As both Rebecca
Skloot’s book and public opinion research reveal, many people
do harbor strong possessive, or at least protective, feelings
towards their tissue. Such feelings may find their source in
religious views on the body—as is the case with Henrietta’s
daughter, who believed that her mother’s soul, in some sense,
resides in her cells.183 Alternatively, they may reside in notions
of bodily integrity, i.e., the conviction that, as a matter of
autonomy, individuals should retain the power to control the
use of their body parts by virtue of the fact that those parts
originated in, and once were a part of, their body. Even
individuals who do not care about the fate of their excised
tissues may well care about whether the information derived
from that tissue could help, or harm, them in the future. Thus,
there are numerous non-property based reasons rooted in
religion, autonomy, or privacy—including individual,184
family,185 and group186 privacy—why tissue contributors may
183. SKLOOT, supra note 2, at 266; see also Harmon, supra note 9 (stating
that to the Havasupai tribe, “blood has deep spiritual meaning”).
184. Genetic biobank research raises particular privacy concerns because it
can reveal personal health information and because of the potential for misuse
of that information by third parties. See, e.g., GENETICS & PUB. POLICY CTR.,
U.S. PUBLIC OPINION ON USES OF GENETIC INFORMATION AND GENETIC
DISCRIMINATION
2
(2007),
available
at
http://www.dnapolicy.org/resources/GINAPublic_Opinion_Genetic_Information
_Discrimination.pdf (presenting the results of a 2007 survey of 1,119 American
adults, which found that 92 percent were concerned that “that results of a
genetic test that tells a patient whether he or she is at increased risk for a
disease like cancer could be used in ways that are harmful to the person”). The
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–233,
prohibits health insurers and employers from discriminating against
individuals based on their genetic information, but the statute does not
remedy all of the potential issues that could arise from the disclosure of
genetic test results. See Susannah Baruch, Your Genes Aren’t Covered for
That: One Year Later, Gaps in Genetic Discrimination Legislation Reveal the
PROGRESS
BLOG,
(June
29,
2009),
Challenges
Ahead,
SCI.
http://www.scienceprogress.org/2009/06/gina-challenges/ (last visited May 11,
2010).
185. Genetic research has implications not only for the research subject,
but also for his or her family members. See, e.g., Lainie Friedman Ross, When
Do Family Members Have a Right to Know Genetic Information About a
Patient?, 337 J. MED. ETHICS 390 passim (2007); see also Béatrice Godard et
al., Guidelines for Disclosing Genetic Information to Family Members: From
Development to Use, 5 FAMILIAL CANCER 103 passim (2006) (discussing the
issues that arise when an individual’s genetic test results indicate that his or
her family members may be at an increased risk for a particular disease).
186. Genetic research enabled by biobanks also has potential implications

JAVITT_MACROS_AUTHOR EDITS (DO NOT DELETE)

752

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

6/10/2010 3:08 PM

[Vol. 11:2

care, and therefore should be consulted about, the use of their
tissues in research.
Respect for these interests requires that would-be
contributors be asked if they are willing to have their tissue
used for research, and a meaningful opportunity to decline to
have it used.187 This choice should be provided whether or not
the tissue is “deidentified.” Deidentification does not change
the fact that the tissue was derived from an individual who
therefore has an interest in being consulted as to its
disposition, although it may alleviate privacy concerns. While
some individuals may elect not to contribute their tissues,
thereby reducing the number of samples available for research,
providing such choice is a requirement of respectful
engagement with the contributors. As a practical matter it is
likely that most people, when treated with such respect, will
choose to contribute;188 but such choice should not be presumed.
Also as a practical matter, in most cases it is likely that any
one individual’s tissue will be individually valuable enough to
afford significant bargaining power, but if prospective
contributors do possess such ability to bargain, either
individually or collectively, then researchers will need to weigh
the importance of the research against their willingness and
ability to meet the terms.189

for group identity. See Dena S. Davis, Groups, Communities and Contested
Identities in Genetic Research, 30 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov.–Dec. 2000, at
passim; Morris W. Foster & Richard R. Sharp, Genetic Research And
Culturally Specific Risks: One Size Does Not Fit All, 16 TRENDS IN GENETICS
93 passim (2000). For example, research conducted on samples from the
Havasupai tribe suggested that tribe’s ancestors had crossed the frozen Bering
Sea to arrive in North America, which “flew in the face of the tribe’s
traditional stories that it had originated in the [Havasu Canyon] and was
assigned to be its guardian.” See Harmon, supra note 9. The tribe was further
concerned that this information could potentially threaten the tribe’s rights to
its land; according to Edmond Tilousi, the tribe’s vice chairman, their origin
from the canyon was “the basis of [their] sovereign rights.” Id.
187. See, e.g., E. Vermeulen et al., A Trial of Consent Procedures for Future
Research with Clinically Derived Biological Samples, 101 BRIT. J. CANCER
1505, 1505 (2009); see also B. Saunders, Normative Consent and Opt-Out
Organ Donation, 36 J. MED. ETHICS 84, 84 (2010).
188. See supra Part III.B.
189. See Sharon F. Terry, Learning Genetics, 22 HEALTH AFF. 166 passim
(2003) (describing the experience of the mother of two children with a genetic
disorder, pseudoxanthoma elasticum (PXE), who founded an advocacy
organization through which she was able to identify and patent the gene with
the causative mutation and thereby control access to samples in a blood and
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Because of the problem of status confusion discussed
above, there needs to be clear separation between the
researcher-subject interaction and the donor-recipient
interaction. When tissue contributors sign a consent document,
they are being informed of the risks and potential benefits of
research participation to them. In contrast, when individuals
are asked to contribute their tissues, they are being invited to
engage in a legal transaction under which they make a gift of
themselves to the researcher and institution, and the terms of
that gift should be clearly delineated.
To be sure, there will be overlap between the domains of
information needed by subjects and donors. For example, both
would-be subjects and prospective donors need to be told if
research results will be returned to them, since such results
could be considered a benefit of research participation and also
could be a factor that a donor considers in deciding whether to
make a donation. Similarly, both would-be subjects and
prospective donors need to know about the researcher and
institution’s financial interests in the research. However, the
status of research subject does not carry with it the ability to
negotiate terms of participation, whereas the status of donor
does. Additionally, the informed consent process presumes a
fiduciary duty by the researcher and institution to the subject,
and, because of this duty, prohibits the inclusion of exculpatory
language in the informed consent document under which the
subject waives legal rights. In contrast, a donation agreement
presumes equal bargaining power and the ability to negotiate
terms of the donation. For these reasons, the consent document
should not be used as the vehicle for the legal transfer of tissue
from the individual to the researcher.
The separation of contributor-as-subject and contributoras-donor could be accomplished by, for example, first providing
a consent form that outlines the purpose of the research and
the risks and benefits of participation, and then providing a
separate “donation agreement” that makes clear the terms of
the legal transaction and the parties to that transaction.190
Although requiring separation of consent to research and
agreement to donate may seem like a proposal for adding yet
tissue bank containing specimens from individuals with PXE).
190. For research not covered by the Common Rule or other federal human
subject regulations, researchers or institutions should nevertheless be
required to provide a donation agreement to prospective contributors of tissue.
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another piece of paper to an arguably already cumbersome
process, the small piece of paper is performing a huge ethical
and legal task; simultaneously protecting the ethical principles
embodied in the requirement for informed consent while
ensuring that the proper legal framework is applied to human
tissue donations.
VI. CONCLUSION
The events that took place with respect to Henrietta
Lacks’s cells are long past. However, by casting our gaze
backwards at these events, while reviewing what is currently
known about public attitudes toward the use of tissue samples
in research and the legal disputes that have arisen from such
use, allows the identification of limitations in the current legal
approach to the use of such tissues. Moreover, the exercise
enables the development of new legal and ethical framework to
govern interactions between prospective donors of tissue and
the researchers and institutions who receive them.
As Justice Mosk recognized in 1990, there is a “third
party” to human tissue research: the contributor of the human
tissue. Rebecca Skloot’s account of one of these contributors,
Henrietta Lacks, shows the harms that can result—in the form
of feelings of betrayal and distrust—when the interests of these
third parties are not considered fully and their legal status not
prospectively defined. Subsequent case law has continued to
devalue the interests, and to misconstrue the status, of these
third parties. Recent public opinion research demonstrates that
these third parties have definite, although not uniform,
preferences and expectations with respect to the use of their
tissues. The human subject framework is an inappropriate, and
inadequate, vehicle for mediating the legal interests of these
third parties.
Thus what is needed is a legal approach, perhaps best
accomplished through new federal legislation that establishes
prospectively clear, uniform terms of engagement between the
three parties to the tissue research enterprise and that
acknowledges prospectively the two distinct roles being played
by contributors of tissues, those of research subject and of
tissue donor. The law need not dictate precise terms, for
example, whether researchers must return results, or whether
or not tissue contributors should share in any benefits deriving
from the research; rather, the law need only create a

JAVITT_MACROS_AUTHOR EDITS (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

WHY NOT TAKE ALL OF ME?

6/10/2010 3:08 PM

755

framework that ensures that contributors of tissue understand
the dual roles they are being asked to play and are provided
information and context appropriate to each of those roles. In
particular, the framework should ensure that all parties to the
enterprise have equal access to relevant information, so that
one party does not disadvantage the other through inadequate
information disclosure and that contributors are not
disadvantaged after the fact by judicial role confusion.
Mandating that roles be properly defined at the outset, and
that information appropriate to each of these roles be provided,
will ensure fairness to the parties, protect the principles
underlying the human subject protection framework, and,
perhaps most importantly, help “maintain the trust and
goodwill” of human-tissue contributors, which is “pivotal to the
success of the research enterprise.”191 At the heart of the wrong
perceived by the Lacks family is that Henrietta “didn’t donate
nothing.”192 Instead, researchers “took [the cells] and didn’t
ask.”193 How fitting it would be if the development of a new,
transparency-based framework for tissue donation, one that is
premised on the simple notion that tissue contributors should
be asked—within a context that allows a meaningful answer—
was Henrietta Lacks’s true legacy.

191. See Beskow & Dean, supra note 88, at 1447.
192. SKLOOT, supra note 2, at 169.
193. Id.

